Pharmaceutical Industry Funding to Patient-Advocacy Organizations: A Cross-National Comparison of Disclosure Codes and Regulation by Karas, Laura et al.
Hastings International and Comparative Law Review
Volume 42
Number 2 Summer 2019 Article 3
Summer 2019
Pharmaceutical Industry Funding to Patient-
Advocacy Organizations: A Cross-National
Comparison of Disclosure Codes and Regulation
Laura Karas
Robin Feldman
Ge Bai
So Yeon Kang
Gerard F. Anderson
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/
hastings_international_comparative_law_review
Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, and the International Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings International and Comparative Law Review by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please
contact wangangela@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
Laura Karas, Robin Feldman, Ge Bai, So Yeon Kang, and Gerard F. Anderson, Pharmaceutical Industry Funding to Patient-Advocacy
Organizations: A Cross-National Comparison of Disclosure Codes and Regulation, 42 Hastings Int'l & Comp.L. Rev. 453 (2019).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_international_comparative_law_review/vol42/iss2/3
Volume 42Article 1 Number 2 Spring 2019 
453 
 
Pharmaceutical Industry Funding to Patient-Advocacy 
Organizations: A Cross-National Comparison of 
Disclosure Codes and Regulation 
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GE BAI, PH.D., CPA;3 SO YEON KANG, MPH, MBA;4  AND 
GERARD F. ANDERSON, PH.D.5 6 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Transparency has become one of the primary themes in health care 
reform efforts in the United States and across the world.  In the face of 
exorbitant drug prices, high levels of patient cost-sharing, and 
pharmaceutical expenditures that consume a growing proportion of public 
sector budgets, much attention has been drawn to the pharmaceutical 
industry.  Congressional investigations, academic publications, and news 
articles have endeavored to reveal the extent of drug and device industry 
influence on health care actors.  In response, several nations, including the 
United States, have passed legislation mandating disclosure of drug 
company payments to physicians.  In the United States, there are currently 
no legal requirements for disclosure of pharmaceutical industry 
sponsorship to patient-advocacy organizations by either party to the 
transaction.  An ongoing concern is that drug industry payments could 
interfere with the objectivity of patient-advocacy groups and may induce 
them to take public positions favorable to the drug industry but at odds 
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with the interests of patients.  This article provides a comparative analysis 
of industry codes of practice and regulation that govern relationships 
between pharmaceutical companies and patient-advocacy organizations in 
the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Australia and 
Canada, with an emphasis on disclosure policies for industry sponsorship.  
The article draws upon the practices of other nations and the Physician 
Payments Sunshine Act to make a case for an expansion of the Sunshine 
Act to patient-advocacy groups.   
Keywords: Sunshine Act; patient-advocacy organizations; disclosure; 
pharmaceutical industry; conflict of interest 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Research has identified concerns about the connection between 
funding and decision-making in medical research and practice.  For 
example, a meta-analysis of studies demonstrated that industry-sponsored 
research trials were 3.6 times more likely to reach conclusions favorable to 
industry than those without industry sponsorship.7  Another study found 
that physicians who received pharmaceutical industry gifts subsequently 
shifted their prescribing patterns: they tended to write more prescriptions 
and prescribed brand drugs more heavily.8  Likewise, concerns have been 
raised about industry relationships with patient-advocacy organizations; 
these groups that have faced criticism for accepting funding from the drug 
industry and seemingly prioritizing industry interests above those of 
patients. 9, 10, 11 
While funding from industry plays an important role in ensuring 
financial viability for patient-advocacy organizations, it may compromise 
the independence of these organizations and create conflicts of interest.  
For instance, under pressure from a Congressional investigation led by 
 
 7. Justin E. Bekelman et al., Scope and Impact of Financial Conflicts of Interest in 
Biomedical Research: A Systematic Review, 289 JAMA 454, 454-465 (2003). 
 8. Susan F. Wood et al., Influence of Pharmaceutical Marketing on Medicare 
Prescriptions in the District of Columbia, 12(10) PLOS ONE, e0186060 (2017).   
 9. Emily Kopp & Rachel Bluth, Nonprofit Linked to PhRMA Rolls out Campaign to 
Block Drug Imports, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (April 19, 2017), https://khn.org/news/non-
profit-linked-to-phrma-rolls-out-campaign-to-block-drug-imports/ (last visited June 3, 
2018). 
 10. Ray Moynihan & Lisa Bero, Toward a Healthier Patient-advocacy Voice: More 
Independence, Less Industry Funding, 177 JAMA INTERN. MED. 350-51 (2017). 
 11. GARDINER HARRIS, Drug Makers are Advocacy Groups’ Biggest Donors, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 21, 2009, https://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/22/health/22nami.html (last visited 
June 4, 2018). 
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Senator Charles Grassley, the National Alliance on Mental Illness 
(“NAMI”) revealed that it receives nearly two-thirds of its donations from 
pharmaceutical companies.12  NAMI adopted a pro-industry stance toward 
FDA’s black-box warning on antidepressants, which alerts patients and 
prescribers to the risk of suicide in children and adolescents, by arguing 
that the warning deters treatment and that the label omits the risk of suicide 
from untreated mental illness.13  A Congressional investigation led by 
former Senator Claire McCaskill exposed donations by opioid 
manufacturers to patient-advocacy groups such as the American Pain 
Foundation; this group and others were accused of downplaying the risks of 
opioid drugs and promoting opioid usage.14   
A spokesperson for the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers 
of America (“PhRMA”), the trade association for U.S. biopharmaceutical 
and biotechnology companies, has been quoted as saying that “patient 
groups and biopharmaceutical companies share the same goal of improving 
patient access to innovative therapies and ensuring the continued 
development of new treatments and cures.”15  However, the primary goal of 
any company is, and should be, to create value for its shareholders, while 
the primary goal of a patient-advocacy organization is to serve its patients.  
Although in many circumstances these goals are aligned, in other cases 
they may be in conflict. Policymakers and the public must be able to 
discern when conflicts exist.  
There have been calls for increased scrutiny and transparency of 
pharmaceutical industry funding to patient-advocacy organizations in the 
U.S. 16, 17, 18; yet, there is currently no publicly available record, nor any 
 
 12. Grassley works for disclosure of drug company payments to medical groups, 
CHUCK GRASSLEY: UNITED STATES SENATOR FOR IOWA (Dec. 8, 2009),  https://www. 
grassley.senate.gov/news/news-releases/grassley-works-disclosure-drug-company-
payme nts-medical-groups (last visited June 4, 2018). 
 13. FDA Announcement on Black Box Warning Label for Antidepressants Used With 
Children, THE NATIONAL ALLIANCE ON MENTAL ILLNESS (Oct. 15, 2004),  https://www. 
nami.org/Press-Media/Press-Releases/2004/FDA-Announcement-on-Black-Box-
Warning-Label-for-An (last visited June 3, 2018). 
 14. BREAKING: Millions in Payments Among Findings of McCaskill Opioid 
Investigation into Ties Between Manufacturers and Third Party Advocacy Groups, WEBSITE 
OF UNITED STATES SENATOR CLAIRE MCCASKILL (Feb. 12, 2018), https://www.mccaskill. 
senate.gov/media-center/news-releases/breaking-millions-in-payments-among-
findings-of-mccaskill-opioid-investigation-into-ties-between-manufacturers-and-
third-party-advocacy-groups- (last visited June 3, 2018). 
 15. Jayne O’Donnell, Patient-advocacy Groups Funded by Drug Companies are 
Largely Mum on High Drug Prices, USA TODAY, Jan. 21, 2016, https://www.usatoday.com/ 
story/news/nation/2016/01/21/patient-advocacy-groups-drug-makers-high-drug-prices/790 
01722 (last visited Apr. 28, 2018).  
 16. Matthew S. McCoy et al., Conflicts of Interest for Patient-Advocacy Organizations, 
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standardized disclosure required by either side of these financial 
exchanges. Instead, news sources and Congressional investigations attempt 
to fill the gap.  In a recent report, Kaiser Health News (“KHN”) identified 
over 1,200 patient-advocacy organizations in the U.S., of which nearly half 
received funding from pharmaceutical companies: KHN found that 14 
pharmaceutical companies gave over $116 million dollars to 594 patient-
advocacy groups in 2015.19   
The Physician Payments Sunshine Act requires disclosure of 
payments and transfers of value from drug, device, biologic, and medical 
supply manufacturers to physicians and teaching hospitals in the U.S.  As 
legal academic Marc Rodwin has written, “at the core of doctoring lies 
tension between self-interest and faithful service to patients and the 
public.”20  The same tension exists with not-for-profit organizations that 
represent patients in the collective, yet must also secure income adequate to 
sustain their efforts and ensure their continued existence.  The Physician 
Payments Sunshine Act and disclosure of contributions to patient-advocacy 
organizations are based on the same principle: transparency would allow 
the public and policymakers to understand the potential for conflicts of 
interest and act so as to mitigate potential harm to patients and the public. 
Though standardized disclosure of industry contributions to patient-
advocacy organizations is absent in the U.S., this is not the case in many 
other countries. Drug industry trade associations in many nations have 
instituted codes of practice that establish guidelines for the interactions 
between pharmaceutical companies and patient-advocacy organizations, 
including disclosure policies, and several nations have enacted legislation 
to mandate disclosure.  Both laws and codes of practice routinely place the 
reporting burden on drug and device companies.  While laws require 
disclosure, codes of practice are voluntary; they rely on a company’s 
willingness to comply, and enforcement of the terms of these codes for 
failure to comply is not guaranteed.  
This article proceeds in six sections.  Section I introduces the issue of 
disclosure of pharmaceutical industry funding to patient-advocacy groups.  
 
376 NEW ENG. J. MED, 880-885 (2017). 
 17. Susannah L. Rose et al., Patient Advocacy Organizations, Industry Funding, and 
Conflicts of Interest, 177 JAMA INTERN. MED. 344-350 (2017). 
 18. Norman R. Augustine et al., Making Medicines Affordable: A National Imperative, 
NAT’L ACADEMIES OF SCI. ENG’G & MED. 93-94 (2017). 
 19. Emily Kopp et al., Patient Advocacy Groups Take in Millions from Drugmakers. Is 
There a Payback?, KAISER HEALTH NEWS, https://khn.org/news/patient-advocacy-groups-
take-in-millions-from-drugmakers-is-there-a-payback/ (last visited Dec. 21, 2018).  
 20. Marc A. Rodwin, The Heart of the Matter, in CONFLICTS OF INT. AND THE FUTURE 
OF MED.: THE U.S., FR, AND JAPAN, Oxford U. Press, 20-37 (2011). 
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Section II provides a cross-national comparison of the laws and industry 
codes of practice that govern disclosure of pharmaceutical industry 
payments to patient-advocacy organizations in the United States, the 
United Kingdom, Germany, France, Australia, and Canada.  Section III 
compares government-mandated disclosure to voluntary self-regulation by 
the drug industry and reaches the conclusion that a combination of both 
mechanisms may be most fitting to address industry sponsorship of patient-
advocacy organizations.  Section IV draws lessons from the Physician 
Payments Sunshine Act to make recommendations for disclosure policy 
relating to payments and transfers of value to patient-advocacy 
organizations in the U.S.  Section V extends the discussion to professional 
medical associations, and the final section offers concluding remarks. 
 
II. A CROSS-NATIONAL COMPARISON OF  
DISCLOSURE CODES AND REGULATION 
 
We conducted a qualitative comparison of the pharmaceutical trade 
association codes of practice and government regulations guiding industry 
relationships with patient-advocacy groups in the United States, the United 
Kingdom, Germany, France, Australia, and Canada.  The nations were 
purposively chosen to be illustrative of the advancements of pertinent 
national industry codes and regulations.  The European supranational code 
put forth by the European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries and 
Associations (“EFPIA”) was also examined for provisions applicable to 
relationships with patient-advocacy organizations.  Based on the content of 
the codes, we established a 17-point checklist of common principles 
relating to financial and non-financial disclosure and other governing 
principles of interactions with patient-advocacy organizations, and 
subsequently scored each code according to the presence or absence of 
these principles (Table 1).  The discussion that follows provides greater 
detail on the substance of each code, as well as relevant national law and 
regulation relating to disclosure of industry support to patient-advocacy 
organizations.  This article does not consider industry sponsorship of 
patient assistance programs, which provide financial assistance to 
qualifying patients for the purchase of pharmaceutical drugs. 
 
A. United States 
 
There is currently no federal legislation mandating disclosure of drug 
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company funding to patient-advocacy organizations, other than regulations 
related to filing a citizen petition at the FDA21 (that regulation only requires 
disclosure of a party who directly funds the particular petition filed).  The 
Physician Payments Sunshine Act, passed in 2010 as part of the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act, requires disclosure of payments and 
transfers of value from drug, device, biologic, and medical supply 
manufacturers to physicians and teaching hospitals (“Covered Recipients”), 
but not to patient-advocacy organizations.  Beginning in 2014, 
manufacturers that have at least one product reimbursed by Medicare or 
Medicaid must disclose these payments on a public website — the Open 
Payments database.22  
Senators Herb Kohl and Chuck Grassley first introduced the Physician 
Payments Sunshine Act in 200723 after Senate investigations revealed that 
researchers at major universities failed to disclose millions of dollars of 
pharmaceutical industry payments, sometimes while holding investments in 
the companies they were funded to study.24  Physicians were frequent 
recipients of sponsorship from the drug and device industry, which took 
various forms including monetary payments for consultation services, paid 
speaking arrangements, grants, gifts, free meals, paid travel expenses and 
other perks.25, 26  A study published in the New England Journal of 
Medicine in 2007 found that 94 percent of physicians accepted some form 
of financial or non-financial “benefits” from industry.27   
The Physician Payments Sunshine Act sought to cast a public light on 
payments and inducements to physicians, which could compromise their 
 
 21. Robin Feldman & Rabiah Oral, Comments, FDA Public Meeting on Hatch Waxman 
Amendments: Ensuring a Balance Between Innovation and Access (Sept. 18, 2017). 
 22. Medicare, Medicaid, Children’s Health Insurance Programs; Transparency Reports 
and Reporting of Physician Ownership or Investment Interests, 78 Fed. Reg. 27 (to be 
codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 402, 403). 
 23. Physician Payments Sunshine Act of 2007, S. 2029, 110th Cong. (2007). 
 24. Let the Sunshine in: Implementing the Physician Payments Sunshine Act: 
Roundtable before the S. Special Committee on Aging, 112th Congress, Second Session 
(2012). 
 25. Grassley works to disclose financial ties between drug companies and doctors,  
CHUCK GRASSLEY, UNITED STATES SENATOR FOR IOWA (Jan. 22, 2009), https://www. 
grassley.senate.gov/news/news-releases/grassley-works-disclose-financial-ties-
between-drug-companies-and-doctors (last visited Mar. 16, 2018). 
 26. Paid to Prescribe?: Exploring the Relationship between Doctors and the Drug 
Industry: Hearing before the S. Special Comm. on Aging, 110th Cong. (2007),  
https://www.aging.senate.gov/hearings/paid-to-prescribe-exploring-the-relationship-
betwe en-doctors-and-the-drug-industry (last visited Mar. 16, 2018). 
 27. Eric G. Campbell et al., A National Survey of Physician-industry Relationships, 356 
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1742-50 (2007). 
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independence and could influence prescribing practices in favor of more 
expensive brand drugs.  The Act mandates disclosure of the amount and 
form of the payment or transfer of value, the date it is provided, the name 
and address of the recipient, and a description of the nature of the 
payment.28  The Act also contains a requirement for disclosure of 
ownership or investment interests held by physicians or their immediate 
family members in a covered manufacturer or group purchasing 
organization (“GPO”).   
Corporate integrity agreements (“CIAs”) between pharmaceutical 
companies and the U.S. Office of Inspector General often mandate a level 
of reporting that exceeds that required by the Physician Payments Sunshine 
Act.  For example, a CIA may obligate a pharmaceutical company to 
disclose the monetary value and recipients of philanthropic grants, 
fundraising contributions, or other sponsorship provided to non-profit 
organizations, including patient-advocacy groups and professional 
societies.29  The reporting obligations under CIAs may explain disclosure 
of funding to patient-advocacy groups by some U.S. pharmaceutical 
companies, rather than voluntary rigor in transparency practices.  The 
durability of disclosure reporting prompted by a CIA is questionable, as the 
agreement typically lasts for five years, after which a company may choose 
to discontinue disclosure practices not required by law. 
Recently, proposed legislation has sought to place payments to patient 
groups within the scope of required reporting under the Physician 
Payments Sunshine Act.  Following an investigation led by Senator 
McCaskill’s office which revealed that opioid manufacturers, including 
Purdue Pharma, gave over eight million dollars from 2012 to 2017 to 
fourteen “outside working groups” on opioid-related issues,30 Senator 
McCaskill introduced the “Patient Advocacy Transparency Act” (S.3000, 
115th Cong.) in June of 2018.  This bill would amend the Physician 
Payments Sunshine Act to require reporting of certain forms of industry 
 
 28. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 6002, 124 Stat. 
119, 689 (2010) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1320(a)). 
 29. Corporate Integrity Agreement between the Off. of Inspector Gen. of the Dep’t of 
Health and Human Services & Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corporation,  Off. of Inspector 
Gen., Corporate Integrity Agreement Documents (effective Sept. 29, 2010, updated Mar. 15, 
2018), https://oig.hhs.gov/compliance/corporate-integrity-agreements/cia-documents.asp#n 
(last visited July 5, 2018). 
 30. Fueling an Epidemic, Report Two, Exposing the Financial Ties between Opioid 
Manufacturers and Third Party Advocacy Groups, U.S. Senate Comm. on Homeland 
Security & Governmental Affairs (Ranking member’s office), https://www.hsgac. 
senate.gov/media/minority-media/breaking-millions-in-payments-among-findings-of-
mcc askill-opioid-investigation-into-ties-between-manufacturers-and-third-party-
advocacy-gr oups- (last visited Dec. 22, 2018). 
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sponsorship to patient groups, professional societies, and providers of 
continuing medical education.  No further Congressional action has been 
taken on S.3000, and it remains to be seen whether it will face headwinds 
from industry or funding recipients.   
In response to the Physician Payments Sunshine Act, some warned of 
a dampening effect on innovation resulting from fewer physician-industry 
relationships31 32 - it was argued that physicians who received payments 
would be unfairly stigmatized and would avoid engaging with drug and 
device companies.  Since the benefits resulting from physician-industry 
collaboration would not be concomitantly measured and presented, the 
Open Payments database could present a picture of industry influence that 
is unfairly skewed.  From this response, we anticipate that the reaction to 
mandatory reporting of payments to patient-advocacy groups may highlight 
the many benefits and synergies resulting from their partnerships with 
industry.  Disclosure of funding, however, need not lead to a decrease in 
funding, and transparency will encourage greater emphasis on ethical 
boundaries. 
In the U.S., PhRMA has established a code entitled “Principles on 
Interactions with Patient Organizations.”  It states that pharmaceutical 
companies must respect the independence of patient-advocacy 
organizations and may provide financial support for activities that are 
primarily “professional, educational, or scientific in nature.”33  There is no 
requirement or recommendation for public disclosure of industry funding to 
these organizations.34  As will be shown below, this stands in contrast to 
the codes of practice that pharmaceutical trade associations of many other 
developed nations have established.   
With respect to disclosure by patient-advocacy organizations 
themselves, no mandatory reporting of company-level funding exists in the 
United States.  While dual disclosure may seem redundant, it can 
 
 31. Thomas Sullivan, Physician Payment Sunshine Act: Radiologists Concerned with 
Potential Mischaracterizations of Relationships with Industry. POL’Y & MED. (May 6, 
2018),  https://www.policymed.com/2013/10/physician-payment-sunshine-act-
radiologists-concerned-with-potential-mischaracterizations-of-relationships-with-
industry.html (last visited Dec. 26, 2018). 
 32. Thomas Sullivan, Physician Payment Sunshine: Media Missing the Mark – This 
Could be Sunset for Innovation, POL’Y & MED. (May 6, 2018), 
https://www.policymed.com/ 2012/01/physician-payment-sunshine-media-missing-the-
mark-this-could-be-sunset-for-innovation.html (last visited Dec. 26, 2018).   
 33. PhRMA Principles on Interactions with Patient Organizations, PHRMA WEBSITE, 
http://phrma-
docs.phrma.org/sites/default/files/pdf/phrma_principles_paper_20120919_ final.pdf 
(last visited July 3, 2018). 
 34. Id. 
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accomplish different purposes and have different effects.  It is the view of 
the authors that both forms of disclosure are necessary to properly address 
the conflict of interest inherent in the exchange between the two parties.  
The National Health Council (“NHC”), an umbrella organization for U.S. 
“health-related organizations,” has over fifty member patient-advocacy 
organizations (also referred to as voluntary health agencies).35  The NHC 
recently implemented a Standards of Excellence Certification Program 
consisting of thirty-eight standards that deal with “governance, human 
resources, programs, fundraising, finance, accounting and reporting, and 
evaluation.”  Standard 31, which pertains to corporate relationships, 
requires: 
disclosure of the name of the individual corporation identified on 
Schedule B of its Form 990 (more than the greater of $5,000 or 
2% of the total amount of contributions reported  on line 1H of 
Part VIII of Form 990) and the aggregate amount of support 
provided by each corporation OR the total amount of corporate 
support from pharmaceutical, biotechnology, and medical device 
companies as a percentage of total organizational revenue 
[emphasis added].36 
This standard permits a patient-advocacy organization to circumvent 
disclosure of company-specific support, and indeed many US patient-
advocacy organizations do not disclose the specific amounts provided to 
them from particular pharmaceutical companies; rather, they provide an 
aggregate value for total corporate sponsorship.  While individual patient-
advocacy organizations can choose to address the issue of disclosure of 
corporate sponsorship through internal policies, such policies are not 
common; in a survey based on a random sample of patient-advocacy 
organizations, only one-quarter (73 of 284 patient-advocacy organizations 
surveyed) reported having disclosure policies for public reporting of 
industry financial relationships.37  A study of disclosure information 
featured on national and international patient-advocacy organization 
websites found that only a fraction (7 of 37) of the patient-advocacy 
organizations with annual reports included corporate donations, and of 
those, none provided the level of detail necessary to ascertain 
 
 35. NAT’L HEALTH COUNCIL: MEMBERSHIP DIRECTORY, http://www.nationalhealth 
council.org/about-nhc/membership-directory (last visited July 3, 2018). 
 36. NAT’L HEALTH COUNCIL: Standards of Excellence Certification Program for 
Voluntary Health Agencies (January 2017), http://www.nationalhealthcouncil.org/ 
sites/default/files/NHC_Files/Governance/Full_Standards_of_Excellence.pdf (last 
visited July 3, 2018). 
 37. See supra note 17. 
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pharmaceutical company-level funding.38  Website disclosures were not 
always consistent with annual reports, and none of the websites examined 
in the study indicated the proportion of a patient-advocacy group’s total 
income obtained from pharmaceutical companies.39 
 
B.  Europe 
 
The European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries and 
Associations (“EFPIA”), which consists of national pharmaceutical 
industry trade associations from thirty-three European countries40 and forty 
member pharmaceutical companies (both full members and member 
affiliates),41 has put forth codes that govern relationships with health care 
entities.  The Code of Practice on Relationships between the 
Pharmaceutical Industry and Patient Organizations, hereafter referred to as 
the EFPIA Patient Organization Code, contains provisions that apply 
specifically to interactions with patient-advocacy groups,42 including a 
prohibition on the requirement of single-company funding of a patient-
advocacy organization (Article 7) and the requirement of a written 
agreement for financial support and significant non-financial support to 
patient-advocacy organizations (Article 2).  It also requires annual 
disclosure of a list of all patient-advocacy organizations to which a 
company provides support, the monetary value of the support and invoiced 
costs, and an account of the nature of the support “that is sufficiently 
complete to enable the average reader to form an understanding of the 
significance of the support” (Article 5).43 
The EFPIA Patient Organization Code requires written approval for a 
pharmaceutical company’s use of a patient-advocacy organization’s logo or 
proprietary material (Article 3) and prohibits companies from shaping a 
 
 38. Douglas E. Ball, Klara Tisocki, & Andrew Herxheimer, Advertising and Disclosure 
of Funding on Patient-advocacy Organisation Websites: A Cross-sectional Survey, 6 BMC 
PUB. HEALTH 201 (2006). 
 39. Id. 
 40. EFPIA Disclosure Code: Frequently asked questions, WEBSITE OF EFPIA (Eur.), 
http://www.esmo.org/Policy/EFPIA-Disclosure-Code/Frequently-Asked-
Questions#eztoc9 58298_0_1_6 (last visited May 14, 2018).  
 41. EFPIA Corporate Members, WEBSITE OF EFPIA (Eur.), https://www.efpia.eu/about-
us/membership (last visited May 14, 2018). 
 42. EFPIA Code of Practice on Relationships Between the Pharmaceutical Industry 
and Patient Organisations, WEBSITE OF EFPIA (Eur.), https://www.efpia.eu/ 
media/24310/3c_efpia-code-of-practice-on-relationships-pharmapluspt-orgs.pdf (last 
visited Apr. 9, 2018). 
 43. Id. 
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patient-advocacy organization’s written materials to further their 
commercial interests (Article 4). 
The EFPIA Patient Organization Code, along with the EFPIA Code on 
Disclosure of Transfers of Value from Pharmaceutical Companies to 
Healthcare Professionals and Healthcare Organizations (hereafter referred 
to as the “EFPIA Disclosure Code”),44 establish minimum standards for 
disclosure.  However, they do not exempt companies from abiding by more 
rigorous national laws or codes.  National EFPIA member associations, not 
EFPIA itself, retain the responsibility to impose sanctions on member 
companies that violate relevant code or law.45  The EFPIA Patient 
Organization Code requires that member trade associations establish a 
complaint procedure and a national body to manage complaints.46 
 
1. United Kingdom 
 
The Association of the British Pharmaceutical Industry (“ABPI”) 
issued the most recent version of its Code of Practice for the 
Pharmaceutical Industry in 2016.  The ABPI Code of Practice is a 
comprehensive set of guidelines and standards outlining appropriate 
relationships between pharmaceutical companies and other groups, 
including patient-advocacy organizations.  Clause 27.7 of the ABPI Code 
echoes the EFPIA Patient Organization Code: all member companies must 
disclose annually to the public a listing of patient-advocacy organizations 
to which they provide “financial support and/or significant indirect/non-
financial support,” along with a “description of the nature of the support 
that is sufficiently complete to enable the average reader to form an 
understanding of the significance of the support,” and disclosure of the 
monetary or non-monetary value of the support.47  The Code allows for 
optional reporting of the patient-advocacy organization’s total income and 
the percentage of total income attributable to pharmaceutical company 
donation.  Companies must report a listing of patient-advocacy 
 
 44. EFPIA HCP/HCO Disclosure Code, WEBSITE OF EFPIA (Eur.), https://www. 
efpia.eu/media/25837/efpia-disclosure-code.pdf (last visited May 14, 2018). 
 45. See supra note 40.  
 46. EFPIA Code of Practice on Relationships between the Pharmaceutical Industry and 
Patient-advocacy Organizations, Annex II: Implementation and Procedure Rules, WEBSITE 
OF EFPIA, (Eur.), https://www.efpia.eu/media/24310/3c_efpia-code-of-practice-on-
relation ships-pharmapluspt-orgs.pdf (last visited May 14, 2018).   
 47. ABPI Code of Practice for the Pharmaceutical Industry (2016) (U.K.), 
http://www.pmcpa.org.uk/thecode/Documents/Code%20of%20Practice%202016%20.pdf 
(last visited Apr. 4, 2018). 
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organizations that they have engaged for contracted services, such as 
speaking arrangements, consulting services, or involvement in advisory 
board meetings (Clause 27.8), including the total amount paid to each 
patient-advocacy organization over the reporting period.48 
The ABPI Code of Practice also requires that pharmaceutical 
companies establish written agreements with patient-advocacy 
organizations, including provisions governing engagements for consulting 
or other services, but does not require that such agreements be made public.  
Other provisions prohibit a company from requiring that it serve as the 
singular source of financial support for a patient-advocacy organization 
(Clause 27.4); require written agreements for public use of a patient-
advocacy organization’s logo or other proprietary materials (Clause 27.5); 
and prohibit the utilization of a patient-advocacy organization’s materials 
to advance a pharmaceutical company’s commercial interests (Clause 
27.6).49  ABPI currently has over 60 full members,50 which supply ninety 
percent of the pharmaceuticals consumed by the National Health Service.51  
The organization maintains a centralized database, Disclosure UK,52 
accessible from its website, which provides a listing of charitable donations 
searchable by health care organization and pharmaceutical company.   
The ABPI Code of Practice does not impose monetary fines or 
penalties for non-disclosure.  Rather, companies must demonstrate that they 
are taking steps to correct a breach and comply with the code.  “Serious 
cases” may result in sanctions, including but not limited to an audit of 
company procedures, submission of a corrective statement, public 
reprimand, and suspension or exclusion from membership in ABPI.53   
 
2. Germany 
 
The German regulatory body for pharmaceutical companies, FSA 
(“Freiwillige Selbstkontrolle für die Arzneimittelindustrie e.V.,” or 
“Voluntary Self-regulation for the Pharmaceutical Industry”) has fifty-five 
 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. ABPI Members List, WEBSITE OF ABPI (U.K.), https://www.abpi.org.uk/ 
membership/abpi-members-list/ (last visited Apr. 4, 2018). 
 51. See supra note 47.   
 52. Disclosure UK, ABPI WEBSITE (U.K.), https://abp-euags.emea.crm.cegedim.c 
om/AggregateSpend360/Posting/ExpenseReport.aspx?postedreporttype=pCctRQJCLQc%3
D&reportID=fzQi4WVhSqKCaerpJbCgxg%3D%3D&Language=NyRIIBaAuMY9s3bTmU
SGXQW6yEjsGDHz&DataValue=qWE1R12&LCID=2057 (last visited Apr. 4, 2018). 
 53. See supra note 47. 
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member companies54 that control roughly seventy-five percent of the 
pharmaceutical market in Germany.55  FSA promulgates a “Code of 
Conduct on the Collaboration with Patient Organizations” and a 
“Transparency Code” that detail requirements for disclosure of 
pharmaceutical company sponsorship to health care entities, including 
physicians, patient-advocacy organizations, and medical institutions.  The 
FSA Board of Arbitration may impose monetary fines for code violations.56  
The FSA Code of Conduct on the Collaboration with Patient 
Organizations contains many principles in common with other codes, 
including the need to respect the “neutrality and independence” of patient-
advocacy organizations (Section 6) and a ban on member companies from 
serving as the exclusive supporter of a patient-advocacy organization or 
any of its activities (Section 16).57  The involvement of pharmaceutical 
companies in patient-advocacy organization-sponsored events must be 
carried out in a “balanced and objective” manner that allows for competing 
or alternative information to be presented (Section 6).  Written agreements 
are required for collaboration between member companies and patient-
advocacy organizations (Section 11) and for contracted services, which are 
restricted to health care-related services only (Section 12).  The promotion 
or recommendation of specific prescription-only pharmaceuticals is 
prohibited (Section 9).   
The FSA Code contains several notable provisions absent from other 
codes; one is the prohibition on member companies from establishing 
patient-advocacy organizations (Section 7), and a prohibition on employees 
or representatives of member companies from acting “in any capacity” for 
patient-advocacy organizations and specifically, exclusion of company 
representatives and employees from serving on executive bodies of patient-
advocacy organizations, other than scientific advisory boards (Section 7).  
Another provision unique to the code is the prohibition of websites 
operated jointly by patient-advocacy organizations and pharmaceutical 
companies, and a ban on links to member company websites from the 
 
 54. FSA Members: At a Glance, WEBSITE OF FSA (2016) (Ger.), https://www.fsa-
pharma.de/der-fsa/auf-einen-blick/ (last visited May 6, 2018). 
 55. Transparency Code: The Second Year, WEBSITE OF FSA (June 21, 2017) (Ger.), 
https://www.pharma-transparenz.de/service/aktuelles/mitteilung/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_ne 
ws%5D=157&cHash=212e1799fad23b65080cdeeb14d64756 (last visited May 6, 2018). 
 56. Ten Facts about the Transparency Code, WEBSITE OF FSA (Ger.), 
https://www.pharma-transparenz.de/fachkreisangehoerige/zehn-fakten-zum-transparenzko 
dex/ (last visited May 6, 2018)  
 57. FSA Code of Conduct on the Collaboration with Patient-Advocacy Organizations, 
WEBSITE OF FSA (Ger.), https://www.fsa-pharma.de/fileadmin/Downloads/Pdf_s/ 
Kodizes__Empfehlungen/Code_of_Conduct_PORG.pdf. (last visited May 21, 2018). 
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websites of patient-advocacy organizations (Section 9).   
With respect to public disclosures, the FSA Code requires annual 
reporting to the public of all patient-advocacy organizations that a member 
company supports through financial or “significant indirect or non-
financial benefits,” including a requirement to report the “total amount of 
monetary benefits and donations in kind per calendar year and patient-
advocacy organization,” or a description of benefits if non-monetary 
(Section 15).  FSA maintains a public database of such sponsorship, 
searchable by pharmaceutical company and by patient organization.58 
The umbrella organization for patient-advocacy groups in Germany, 
BAG SELBSTHILFE, promotes disclosure by patient-advocacy 
organizations.  In 2016, it established an online listing of member groups 
that have dedicated a portion of their homepage to transparency of the 
group’s sponsorship (the “Transparency List”).59  
 
3. France 
 
In 2009, the diabetes drug and off-label weight loss agent Benfluorex 
(trade name “Mediator”) was removed from the market in France after 
resulting in the death of an estimated 2,000 persons due to cardiac 
complications.60, 61 The drug’s maker, Servier, was alleged to have 
concealed Mediator’s safety risks from the French health regulator while 
promoting the drug’s off-label use for weight-loss.62  Servier was also 
alleged to have made payments to individuals with ties to the French 
authorities, including a former French health minister, in order to keep 
Mediator on the market well after other nations had removed it.  In May of 
2013, France signed into law the historic “Loi Bertrand” (also referred to as 
 
 58. Benefits of Member Companies to Patient Organizations for the Year 2017, 
WEBSITE OF FSA (Ger.), https://www.fsa-pharma.de/bezugsgruppen/patientenorganisation/ 
zuwendungen-intern/ (last visited July 5, 2018). 
 59. Grants from Business Enterprises (Transparency List), BAG SELBSTHILFE 
(Ger.), https://www.bag-selbsthilfe.de/informationsportal-selbsthilfe-aktive/unabhaengigk 
eit-der-selbsthilfe/zuwendungen-von-wirtschaftsunternehmen-transparenzliste/ (last visited 
Dec. 21, 2018). 
 60. France’s Servier to Face Trial over Mediator Weight-loss Drug, REUTERS (Sept. 5, 
2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-france-drugs-mediator/frances-servier-to-face-
trial-over-mediator-weight-loss-drug-idUSKCN1BG2G2 (last visited Dec. 22, 2018). 
 61. Scott Sayare, Scandal over Mediator, a French Weight-loss Drug, Prompts Call for 
Wide Changes, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 2011, https://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/12/health/ 
scandal-widens-over-french-weight-loss-drug-mediator.html (last visited Dec. 22, 2018). 
 62. Owen Dyer, France to prosecute its drug regulator and Servier in scandal over 
diabetes drug, j4231 BMJ 358 (2017). 
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the French Sunshine Act) in the spirit of the Physician Payments Sunshine 
Act and as a response to the Mediator scandal.   
A wider range of companies are responsible for disclosure under the 
French Sunshine Act than under U.S. law, including not only 
manufacturers of drugs, devices, biologics, and medical supplies, but also 
makers of cosmetics, contact lenses, health software, and biomaterials.  The 
French Sunshine Act requires disclosure of benefits to a much more 
expansive set of stakeholders, including medical students and trainees, 
nurses, midwives, pharmacists, and dieticians, as well as professional 
medical societies, “associations of users of the health system” (including 
patient-advocacy organizations), media publishing companies, and 
prescription and dispensing software companies.63, 64, 65   
France maintains an online database (La base de données publique 
transparence – Santé), updated biannually and searchable by company, that 
contains information on direct and indirect benefits, the date the exchange 
was made, and the monetary value (with a minimum threshold for 
disclosure of ten euros).66  A 2016 decree expanded the scope to include the 
monetary value of contracted services.67  Knowing failure to comply may 
result in fines, and disclosure must conform with French data privacy laws.   
Les Entreprises du Médicament (“LEEM”), the French pharmaceutical 
trade association and an EFPIA member, issued a code, Dispositions 
Déontologiques Professionnelles,68 that includes a section concerning 
relationships with patient-advocacy organizations.  The code contains many 
of the same provisions as the EFPIA Patient Organization Code. 
LEEM has over 260 member companies.69  CODEEM (le Comité de 
déontovigilance) enforces the LEEM Code through its Litigation and 
 
 63. Quinn Grundy et al., Decoding disclosure: Comparing conflict of interest policy 
among the United States, France, and Australia, 122 HEALTH POL’Y 509-518 (2018). 
 64. Cristiana Spontoni, Françoise Labrousse & Armelle Sandrin-Deforge, French 
Sunshine Obligations Clarified and Extended, Jones Day, LEXOLOGY, Jan. 25, 2017, 
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=54ec76ab-51f6-4a66-b4cd-a86fa765c418 
(last visited May 22, 2018). 
 65. Loi N° 2011-2012 Du 29 Décembre 2011 Relative Au Renforcement De La 
Sécurité Sanitaire Du Médicament Et Des Produits De Santé. 2011, Légifrance: Paris, 
France. 
 66. Base Transparence Santé, https://www.transparence.sante.gouv.fr/flow/main?ex 
ecution=e1s1 (last visited May 22, 2018). 
 67. See supra note 63. 
 68. Dispositions Deontologiques Professionnelles, LES ENTREPRISES DU MÉDICAMENT  
(Jan. 12, 2016) (Fr.), https://www.leem.org/sites/default/files/DDP%20ApplicablesAu-
12%20janv%202016_0.pdf (last visited May 22, 2018). 
 69. Who is LEEM? LES ENTREPRISES DU MÉDICAMENT (Fr.),  https://www.leem.org 
/sites/default/files/Who%20is%20LeemtradLeem.org__0.pdf (last visited May 22, 2018). 
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Sanctions Commission,70 which may institute sanctions on member 
companies for noncompliance, including a warning with or without a 
request for corrective measure, publicized warnings if corrective measures 
are not implemented, and suspension or cancellation of membership in 
LEEM “in case of serious breach or repeated failure.”71  The LEEM code 
also contains a complaint procedure. 
 
C. Australia 
 
Medicines Australia, the trade association that represents 
pharmaceutical companies in Australia, promulgates a Code of Conduct 
that contains guidelines for interactions with patient-advocacy 
organizations, as well as transparency reporting requirements relating to 
patient-advocacy organization funding from industry. 72  The Medicines 
Australia Code of Conduct very closely resembles the language of the 
EFPIA Patient Organization Code, though Medicines Australia is not 
within the jurisdiction of EFPIA.   
Every member pharmaceutical company must provide a list of patient-
advocacy organizations to which it provides “financial support and/or 
significant direct / indirect non-financial support.” 73  The major difference 
as compared to the EFPIA reporting practice is the use of a standardized 
tabular format for reporting.74  Rather than allowing each company to 
report on its own website, Medicines Australia maintains a centralized 
listing75 of the reports of all member pharmaceutical companies, which is 
updated annually.  
The Medicines Australia Code contains the stipulation common to 
many other codes that “no company may request that it be the sole funder 
of a health consumer organization or any of its major programs.”76  The 
 
 70. CODEEM, LES ENTREPRISES DU MÉDICAMENT (Fr.), https://www.leem.org/codeem-
le-comite-de-deontovigilance (last visited May 22, 2018). 
 71. Dispositions Deontologiques Professionnelles, LES ENTREPRISES DU MÉDICAMENT, 
(January 12, 2016) (Fr), https://www.leem.org/sites/default/files/DDP%20ApplicablesAu-
12%20janv%202016_0.pdf (last visited May 22, 2018). 
 72. Med.’s Austl. Code of Conduct Edition 18, WEBSITE OF MED.’S AUSTL. (2014), 
https://medicinesaustralia.com.au/code-of-conduct/code-of-conduct-current-edition/ (last 
visited May 22, 2018). 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Member Company Reports, WEBSITE OF MED’S. AUSTL., https://medicine 
saustralia.com.au/code-of-conduct/transparency-reporting/health-consumer-organisation-
support-reports/member-company-reports/ (last visited July 5, 2018). 
 76. See supra note 72. 
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code proceeds to clarify that “this would not preclude a company who is 
the only supplier of a prescription product for a specific condition or 
disease from sponsoring a health consumer organization or any of its 
programs (14.1).”77   
Medicines Australia currently has over forty member companies in 
various categories of membership.78  The Code of Conduct Committee may 
impose sanctions for breaches of the code, which may include an order to 
terminate improper conduct, issuance of a corrective action, and imposition 
of a monetary fine according to a detailed schedule.79   
 
D. Canada 
 
Innovative Medicines Canada (formerly Canada’s Research-based 
Pharmaceutical Companies), a pharmaceutical trade association with over 
45 member companies,80 first issued “Guidelines for Transparency in 
Stakeholder Funding” in 2009 as an annex to its Code of Ethical Practices.  
“Guidelines for Transparency in Stakeholder Funding” enumerates seven 
principles and eight guidelines to manage relationships with various 
stakeholders, including patient-advocacy organizations.81  Contained within 
the principles are statements promoting the independence and integrity of 
stakeholders and the need for “transparent funding relationships.”82  The 
guidelines articulated in the document prohibit the use of stakeholder 
relationships to promote prescription medicines; require a written 
agreement with details of direct funding to stakeholders; and require 
member companies to report “a list of all stakeholders to which they 
provide direct funding” at regular intervals on their websites or annual 
reports.83  However, there is no requirement or recommendation that 
member companies disclose the value of financial payments or non-
financial transfers to individual stakeholders such as patient-advocacy 
 
 77. Id. 
 78. Our Members, MED’S AUSTL WEBSITE, https://medicinesaustralia.com.au/about-
us/our-members/ (last visited May 22, 2018). 
 79. See supra note 72. 
 80. Member Companies, INNOVATIVE MED’S CAN., http://innovativemedicines.ca/ 
about/member-companies/ (last visited July 5, 2018). 
 81. Our History, INNOVATIVE MED’S CAN., http://innovativemedicines.ca/about/our-
history/ (last visited July 5, 2018). 
 82. Guidelines for Transparency in Stakeholder Funding, Annex A to the Code of 
Ethical Practices (2018) INNOVATIVE MED’S CAN., http://innovativemedicines.ca/wp-
content/uploads/2018/06/Code-Formatted_Regular_EN-2.pdf (last visited July 5, 2018). 
 83. Id. 
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organizations. Innovative Medicines Canada maintains a complaint process 
and imposes monetary penalties, as well as public reporting on its website, 
in cases of violations of the Code of Ethical Practices.84 
In June 2017, ten member companies of Innovative Medicines Canada 
agreed to voluntarily disclose an aggregate value for three categories of 
payments: (1) payments for the services of Canadian health care 
professionals; (2) payments made to health care organizations; and (3) 
payments to Canadian health care professionals to cover the cost of travel 
to meetings.85  These aggregate disclosures do not include details of 
organization-specific or provider-specific funding.  
In December 2017, Ontario passed the Health Sector Payment 
Transparency Act that mandates annual reporting of transfers of value to 
health care professionals and a wide array of parties within the health care 
sector, including patient-advocacy organizations, foundations, and 
charitable groups.86, 87, 88 The parties responsible for reporting (“payors”) 
include not only drug and device manufacturers, but also wholesalers, 
distributors, marketing firms, and organizers of continuing medical 
education.89  According to the draft regulations, payors are obligated to 
report value transfers made to a lengthy list of recipients, including 
common recipients (hospitals and health care providers), as well as many 
other allied health employees and organizations (advocacy groups, long-
term care providers, colleges and universities, researchers, students, 
immediate family members of these recipients, and any person who is 
employed as a “board member, director, trustee, officer, appointee, 
employee, or agent of the above,” among others).90  
 
 84. Id. 
 85. Voluntary Disclosure of Payments, INNOVATIVE MED’S CAN., http://innovati 
vemedicines.ca/ethics/voluntary-disclosure-of-payments/ (last visited July 5, 2018). 
 86. Thomas Sullivan, Ontario Open Payments: Proposed Rule for the Health Sector 
Payment Transparency Act, POL’Y MED. (Updated May 4, 2018), http://www.policy 
med.com/2018/03/ontario-open-payments-proposed-rule-for-the-health-sector-payment-
transparency-act.html (last visited July 5, 2018). 
 87. Health Sector Payment Transparency Act, S.O. 2017, c. 25, Sched. 4, s. 2 (Can.).  
https://www.ontario.ca/laws/statute/17h25?_ga=2.265956687.1189033580.1524957522-
1335467172.1524957522#BK1 (last visited July 5, 2018). 
 88. Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, Proposed new regulation made under the 
Health Sector Payment Transparency Act, 2017, (Can.), http://www.ontariocanada. 
com/registry/showAttachment.do?postingId=26846&attachmentId=37128 (last visited April 
28, 2018). 
 89. Health Sector Payment Transparency Act, 2017, S.O. 2017, c. 25, Sched. 4, s. 3 
(Can.). 
 90. Health Sector Payment Transparency Act, 2017, Consultation Draft (Can.), 
http://www.ontariocanada.com/registry/showAttachment.do?postingId=26846&attachmentI
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Under the Ontario law, companies are required to report the dollar 
value of the transfer, the nature of the transfer (cash or cash-equivalent, in-
kind item or service, etc.) and the category to which a transfer belongs 
(charitable donation, research, travel and accommodation, operational 
support, etc.).  Reporting will take place electronically, with public 
disclosure on a website operated by the Minister of Health and Long-Term 
Care.  The Health Sector Payment Transparency Act allows for the 
imposition of fines on individuals and on corporations for failure to 
comply.91  The legislation places no reporting obligations on recipients of 
pharmaceutical industry funding.   
 
E. How do These Countries Score on the 17-point Checklist of 
Common Principles and Governance Rating Scale? 
 
As presented in Table 1, the U.S. scores the lowest (3 points), Canada 
scores 9 points, and all other countries score greater than 10 points on the 
17-point checklist of common principles.  Compared to the other countries 
examined here, the U.S. received the lowest score due to the absence from 
the PhRMA “Principles on Interactions with Patient Organizations” of most 
principles contained in other codes.  Of the seventeen common principles 
identified, the PhRMA code contains only three: a statement regarding the 
independence of patient-advocacy organizations, a statement that no 
company should require that it be a patient-advocacy organization’s sole 
funder, and a requirement for written documentation of support. 
A commonality among the industry codes with the exception of 
PhRMA’s “Principles on Interactions with Patient Organizations” is the 
prohibition on advertising prescription pharmaceutical drugs to the public.  
Direct-to-consumer advertising, legally permissible in the U.S., is a key 
factor that distinguishes the U.S. from the other nations considered in our 
analysis.  Direct-to-consumer advertising may contribute to industry 
reluctance to reveal payments to patient organizations in the U.S., since 
payments may help support direct-to-consumer marketing tactics that walk 
a fine line between promotional and non-promotional messaging to 
patients.  The potential influence of patient-advocacy organizations’ 
industry funding on direct-to-consumer advertising to patient-members is 
beyond the scope of our analysis here but represents an important area for 
further research. 
 
d=37129 (last visited July 5, 2018). 
 91. Health Sector Payment Transparency Act, 2017, S.O. 2017, c. 25, Sched. 4, s. 17 
(Can.). 
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Each country’s code of conduct and relevant law were examined for 
the presence of three governance principles: (1) whether code or law 
requires public disclosure of industry funding to patient-advocacy 
organizations; (2) whether code or law requires disclosure on a centralized 
website; and (3) whether code or law imposes monetary penalties for non-
disclosure.  (Only monetary penalties were considered here since they 
represent a more stringent repercussion for non-compliance than non-
monetary penalties.)  Table 2 presents the findings.  A country receives a 0, 
1, 2, or 3 depending on the number of governance principles present.  
Australia, Germany, France, and Canada (taking into account the recently 
passed Health Sector Payment Transparency Act in Ontario) all achieved a 
3 out of 3 rating, signifying intensive disclosure governance.  Of note, 
France and Canada have legislative requirements for disclosure.  The 
United Kingdom achieved a 2 out of 3 rating, in light of the fact that 
financial penalties are not imposed for non-disclosure.  The United States 
earned a 0 out of 3 rating, given that no mandatory disclosure is in place, 
there is no centralized disclosure venue, and there are no monetary 
penalties for non-compliance established in code or law.  Taking the results 
from Tables 1 and 2 together, the U.S. lacks rigorous principles guiding 
pharmaceutical company interactions with patient-advocacy organizations, 
including disclosure policies for drug industry funding to these 
organizations, a feature that stands in contrast to the other industrialized 
nations considered here.   
 
III. MANDATORY REGULATION VS. VOLUNTARY INDUSTRY  
SELF-REGULATION 
 
The chief obstacle to the effectiveness of a voluntary code of conduct, 
and thus the main justification for a legislative solution, is compliance.  For 
example, a company could claim to conform with a trade association code 
of practice while not actually revealing every payment made to a patient-
advocacy organization.  A trade association that promulgates a code may 
not actually impose the sanctions set out in the code for failure to comply.  
Even if sanctions are imposed, they may not be severe enough to deter 
unethical behavior, or companies that desire to conceal payments may 
simply accept a sanction as a cost of doing business.   
Voluntary codes, as opposed to law, are typically not administered by 
an independent agency that can ensure accountability and verify the 
accuracy of reported data through independent audits.  Self-government 
creates disincentives to expose noncompliance or wrongdoing of members.  
The disinclination of governing bodies to enforce their own ethical codes 
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has been referred to as “the conflict within conflict of interest laws.”92  The 
unwillingness of a trade association to expose its own members’ violations 
could render the codes impotent.  Independent audits of pharmaceutical 
company disclosures conducted at regular intervals may serve as a check 
on misleading or incomplete reporting.   
There is a risk that companies will employ voluntary reporting for 
public relations purposes,93, 94 limiting the usefulness of the reports as a 
mechanism for accountability.  The implementation of a standardized 
national disclosure regime according to law or regulation would reduce the 
ability of corporations to fashion their disclosures for a public relations 
advantage.   
Other sectors have wrestled with the issue of mandatory regulation 
versus voluntary corporate self-regulation, especially vis-à-vis policies 
pertaining to safety and the natural environment.  A study of U.S. chemical 
companies that adopted a voluntary environmental, health, and safety code 
— the Responsible Care program — noted that the code established 
“metastandards” that outlined broad goals while placing the process or 
mechanism to achieve those goals at the discretion of each company.  This 
strategy allowed for flexibility but also led to heterogeneity in 
implementation practices, which was more prominent for internal practices 
than for external, public-facing practices.95  In keeping with this example, 
public-facing disclosure practices may be more likely to converge on 
uniform standards, which largely corresponds to what has occurred among 
the international codes of practice for interactions with patient-advocacy 
organizations, with the notable exception of the United States where 
disclosure is not recommended or required.  Notwithstanding a tendency 
toward convergence of standards, discrepancies in disclosure practices 
across nations and the complete absence of a disclosure policy in the 
United States give way to inconsistency and obfuscation. 
Of course, government regulation and industry self-regulation are not 
mutually exclusive.  A combination of both mechanisms may be most 
effective in achieving both disclosure and conflict of interest management.  
 
 92. R.M. Rhodes, Enforcement of Legislative Ethics: Conflict within the Conflict of 
Interest Laws, 3 HARVARD J. ON LEGIS. 373-406 (1973). 
 93. Deborah Doane, Market Failure: The Case for Mandatory Social and 
Environmental Reporting, NEW ECON. FOUND. (March 2002), http://thomas.reverdy.free.fr/ 
Envt%20Reporting.pdf. 
 94. Dara O’Rourke, Opportunities and Obstacles for Social Responsibility Reporting in 
Developing Countries, THE WORLD BANK (March 2004), https://nature.berkeley.edu/ 
orourke/PDF/CSR-Reporting.pdf. 
 95. Jennifer Howard, Jennifer Nash, & John Ehrenfeld, Standard or Smokescreen? 
Implementation of a Voluntary Environmental Code, 42 CA MGMT. REV. 63-82 (2000). 
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Industry codes of conduct go far beyond disclosure, as was illustrated in 
Section II, and include many other broad principles to guide ethical 
interactions with patient-advocacy organizations.  Disclosure, and 
enforcement of disclosure, may be best accomplished through law or 
government regulation, while industry codes of conduct and patient-
advocacy organization codes of ethics may provide the necessary 
scaffolding for conflict of interest management once enforceable disclosure 
policy is in place. 
 
IV. LESSONS FROM THE SUNSHINE ACT FOR PATIENT-ADVOCACY 
ORGANIZATIONS 
 
In this section, we use the Physician Payments Sunshine Act as a 
guide to make suggestions for key features of transparency legislation that 
could be designed to regulate the disclosure of industry funding to patient-
advocacy organizations in the U.S.  
 
A. Who Should Report? 
 
The Physician Payments Sunshine Act places reporting obligations 
and penalties for non-disclosure unilaterally on drug, device, biologic, or 
medical supply companies.96  However, it is unclear if industry is the most 
fitting party to disclose funding to patient-advocacy organizations.  On one 
hand, legal systems may choose to place burdens on the party most likely 
to have the relevant information and the ability to comply.  “Applicable 
manufacturers,” the term that defines the companies covered by the 
Physician Payments Sunshine Act’s reporting requirements, currently have 
the infrastructure to meet data collection and reporting requirements.97  
There may be minimal added burden on companies to utilize this 
infrastructure to report payments to patient-advocacy organizations.  On the 
other hand, since patient-advocacy organizations stand to benefit 
substantially from these payments, as a matter of fairness, one could argue 
that they should share accountability for proper reporting.  Unlike 
individual physicians, patient organizations are entities that have boards of 
directors and already have record-keeping and reporting obligations related 
to maintaining their status as tax-exempt organizations under Section 
501(c)(3) of the Federal Tax Code.  
 
 96. Physician Payments Sunshine Act, 42 C.F.R. § 403.904(a-b) 2010. 
 97. Id. § 403.902. 
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Moreover, unless a patient-advocacy organization is required to 
provide data on its sources of income from industry, policymakers will not 
know the extent of their dependency on industry.  As noted by the 
Physician Payments Sunshine Act’s prime sponsor, Senator Chuck 
Grassley (R-IA), “[t]ransparency fosters accountability, and the public has 
a right to know about financial relationships. . . The goal of our legislation 
is to lay it all out, make the information available for everyone to see, and 
let people make their own judgments about what the relationships mean or 
don’t mean.”98  By analogy, disclosure of payments to patient-advocacy 
organizations would allow the public to weigh any potential bias on the 
part of those receiving the funds.  From that perspective, the information 
should be available directly from the organization receiving the funds, 
based on the theory that someone examining the organization would look at 
the organization itself.  
Either legislative or regulatory changes could provide the legal 
mechanism to achieve transparency of drug company funding to patient-
advocacy groups.  As one of the authors has noted in public comments to 
the FDA, the Physician Payments Sunshine Act could be amended to 
include patient-advocacy groups in the definition of “Covered Recipients” 
— as the Patient Advocacy Transparency bill proposes — and to require 
reporting by patient groups as well as by drug companies.99  Alternatively, 
the FDA could require that every patient-advocacy group participating in a 
public forum meet certain disclosure requirements.  The FDA citizen 
petition regulations already require disclosure of value transfers related to 
writing the petition and penalize non-disclosure with civil money penalties.  
These regulations could be expanded to include identification of all third-
parties that fund a patient-advocacy group in general, not just those who 
sponsor a particular petition.  
 
B. What Should be Reported? 
 
It is useful to report the monetary value of charitable donations and 
payments to a patient-advocacy organization, but a more instructive metric 
is the payment amount relative to the total income of the organization.  
Disclosure of this metric is best accomplished through mandatory reporting 
by patient-advocacy organizations.  Although it is inappropriate to require 
public disclosure of a physician’s income, public disclosure of a patient-
advocacy organization’s income is already required within 990 forms 
 
 98. See supra note 25. 
 99. See supra note 21. 
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submitted to the Internal Revenue Service.  Additional reporting 
requirements for company-specific funding and the accompanying 
proportion of a patient-advocacy organization’s total income derived from 
each company could be added to the existing forms, along with a 
requirement to provide the same information on a central website. 
 
C. Accessibility to the Public 
 
A public database, analogous to Open Payments, that is easily 
searchable by pharmaceutical company and by patient-advocacy 
organization, would provide the fullest picture of industry support.  A 
single company’s donations could be viewed through the database, as well 
as a patient-advocacy organization’s sources of pharmaceutical industry 
funding.  This would fulfill two of the key purposes of disclosure: 
achievement of the public’s right to know, and creation of a tool for 
informed decision-making. 
 
D. Sanctions for Inaccurate Reporting and Failure to Comply 
 
The full extent to which pharmaceutical trade associations in other 
nations impose sanctions on companies that fail to report, in accordance 
with the terms of their codes of practice, is unknown.  In the U.S., the 
Physician Payments Sunshine Act allows for civil monetary penalties on 
manufacturers and GPOs “that fail to timely, accurately or completely 
report the information required” by the Act, and imposes greater penalties 
for intentional failure to report.100  It is reasonable that manufacturers 
would face similar penalties for failure to report funding to patient-
advocacy organizations.  As with trade association codes, however, 
sanctions have power only to the extent that they are enforced, and 
governing bodies must have the will to carry out the sanctions set out in the 
regulation. 
 
E. Disclosure as a Starting Point for Conflict of Interest 
Management  
 
The existence of a financial relationship between industry and a 
patient-advocacy organization does not imply wrongdoing, and we do not 
 
 100. Physician Payment Sunshine Act, Penalties for Failure to Report, 42 C.F.R. 
§403.912. 
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espouse putting an end to financial contributions.  Standardized national 
reporting will help foster public trust between patients and the 
organizations that serve them.   
Similar to the Physician Payments Sunshine Act, other financial 
disclosure laws in the United States have been passed in the aftermath of 
scandals and government investigations that attracted public attention and 
aroused public ire.  For example, the Ethics in Government Act of 1978 
was passed after the Watergate scandal and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 
2002 was enacted following prominent accounting scandals involving 
WorldCom, Enron, and other companies.  For both of these landmark 
pieces of legislation, financial disclosure was viewed as a necessary step 
toward repairing public trust.  Academic papers and news articles placing a 
spotlight on payments to patient-advocacy groups have contributed to 
declining public confidence in the independence of these organizations.  In 
this climate, financial disclosure can bolster public trust in patient-
advocacy groups, but it runs the risk of having a trivial impact without 
concurrent efforts to address conflicts of interest.   
Disclosure should fit within a larger strategy of conflict of interest 
management that includes elements such as exclusion of pharmaceutical 
company employees from participation in the boards of patient-advocacy 
organizations, in the vein of the German FSA Code of Conduct; strict 
prohibition on pharmaceutical company marketing, including the posting of 
logos, specific drug names, or other drug advertisements, at patient-
advocacy organization events or in an organization’s materials; and a 
prohibition on involvement of pharmaceutical companies in the 
development or editing of a patient-advocacy organization’s educational 
materials (a provision that is present in the majority of the trade association 
codes considered here, but not in that of PhRMA).  Patients and family 
members who belong to patient-advocacy groups should be informed of the 
existence of online funding disclosure reports and should be encouraged to 
review them.  Maintaining the independence and integrity of patient-
advocacy groups by ensuring separation from the drug company and its 
interests should be the principal aim of conflict of interest management. 
 
V. THE NEXT FRONTIER: PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY FUNDING 
TO PROFESSIONAL MEDICAL ASSOCIATIONS 
 
Similar to patient-advocacy organizations, professional medical 
associations have no legal obligation to disclose corporate funding sources 
in the U.S.  Industry funding to these associations is common, yet 
organizational policies to manage conflicts of interest are inconsistent, and 
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in some cases, inadequate.101, 102  For example, the American Academy of 
Family Physicians (“AAFP”), the main professional organization in the 
United States for family medicine doctors, attracted criticism and lost 
physician members after it established a “Consumer Alliance” with the 
Coca-Cola Company to fund a joint obesity education program and 
consumer education website. 103, 104, 105  According to the AAFP, the 
alliance with Coca-Cola offered “evidence-based information on sugary 
beverages, sweeteners, and healthy living benefits,”106 but many rebuked 
the professional body for accepting money from a company that has a 
vested interest in the sale of sugary beverages and for sending a dangerous 
message that sugary beverages should be part of a healthy diet.   
Industry funding to professional medical associations has the potential 
to imperil the fiduciary duty that those organizations and their physician-
members owe patients.  Some have called upon professional medical 
associations to divest themselves of corporate financial ties.107  Other 
recommendations include capping the percentage of a professional medical 
association’s operating budget that may be derived from industry donation, 
disqualifying those who receive industry support from participating in the 
development of clinical practice guidelines, and requiring physician 
leadership of professional societies to have no financial connections to 
industry.108  Some have suggested a “central repository” for industry 
donations to professional medical associations and to academic medical 
centers for continuing medical education,109, 110 from which funds could be 
 
 101. David J. Rothman et al., Professional Medical Associations and Their Relationships 
with Industry: A Proposal for Controlling Conflict of Interest, 301 JAMA 1367-1372 
(2009). 
 102. Howard Brody, Professional Medical Organizations and Commercial Conflicts of 
Interest: Ethical Issues, 8 ANNALS FAM. MED. 354-358 (2010). 
 103. Id. 
 104. John G. Spangler, Family Medicine’s Sweet Tooth – for Money, ABC NEWS (Nov. 
16, 2009), https://abcnews.go.com/Health/Wellness/coke-partnership-aafp-angers-doctors/ 
story?id=9079376 (last visited May 16, 2018). 
 105. Marion Nestle, Family Doctors Resign from AAFP over Coke Partnership, FOOD 
POL. (Oct. 29, 2009), https://www.foodpolitics.com/2009/10/family-doctors-resign-from-
aafp-over-coke-partnership/ (last visited May 16, 2018). 
 106. AAFP, Coca-Cola End Consumer Alliance Agreement, WEBSITE OF AAFP (June 26, 
2015), https://www.aafp.org/news/inside-aafp/20150626tccc.html (last visited May 16, 
2018). 
 107. See supra note 102. 
 108. David J. Rothman, Professional Medical Associations and Divestiture from 
Industry: An Ethical Imperative for Pain Society Leadership, 17 PAIN MED. 218-219 (2016). 
 109. See supra note 101. 
 110. Troyen A. Brennan et al., Health Industry Practices that Create Conflicts of 
Interest: A Policy Proposal for Academic Medical Centers, 295 JAMA 429-433 (2006). 
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doled out without attribution to any particular donor company.  While these 
strategies place distance between industry sponsors and particular 
activities, they do not eliminate the potential for influence and may not 
provide the recipients with the degree of autonomy they promise. 
A professional medical association is essentially an aggregate of 
individual physicians.  Since industry payments to physicians must be 
disclosed publicly pursuant to the Physician Payments Sunshine Act, so 
should payments provided to a collective of physicians.  This is especially 
important since a collective organization wields more influence over 
prescribing patterns than any individual doctor ever could.  Furthermore, 
the inclusion of teaching hospitals within the statutorily defined “Covered 
Recipients” sets a precedent for disclosure by entities, not just by 
individuals, which paves the way for an expansion of the Physician 
Payments Sunshine Act to professional medical associations and patient-
advocacy organizations. 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
No standardized disclosure exists in the United States for financial 
exchanges between pharmaceutical companies and patient-advocacy 
organizations, while trade association codes in other nations obligate such 
disclosure.  The lack of transparency in the United States introduces doubt 
and mistrust in the public mind and leaves room for malfeasance.  To 
address the gap, the U.S. could expand the scope of the Physician Payments 
Sunshine Act, and it may be prudent to place reporting obligations on 
patient groups as well as pharmaceutical companies. Standardized and 
vigilantly enforced disclosure policies along with rigorous conflict of 
interest management can help these entities remain faithful to their 
purposes.   
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Table 1. Principles contained in pharmaceutical trade association 
codes governing relationships with patient organizations. (X indicates 
the presence of that principle in the code.) 
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Notes:  
1: “The pharmaceutical industry is in favor of patient associations being 
funded by multiple sources.” 
2. “To the greatest extent practicable, a Member should not be the 
exclusive funder of a stakeholder organization.” 
3. Left to the discretion of member associations. 
4. As per the Bertrand Act. 
5. As per the Commonwealth Therapeutic Goods Legislation. 
6. Not specifically for patient organizations; only stated for healthcare 
providers (HCPs) or administrative staff. 
7. A complaint form is accessible from the FSA website. 
8. “Members should refrain from creating patient groups whose sole 
purpose is to further market access in an area of therapeutic interest.” 
9. Exception for participation in scientific advisory boards. 
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Table 2.  A comparison of key features of transparency reporting.  
 
 
 
Notes: 
1. Includes national pharmaceutical industry associations from 33 
European countries. 
2. EFPIA Code on Disclosure of Transfers of Value from Pharmaceutical 
Companies to Healthcare Professionals and Healthcare Organizations, 
WEBSITE OF EFPIA, http://www.efpia-e4ethics.eu/usd/e4ethics.n 
sf/_/65E5C4055CA73D5BC125806E004713C6/%24File/FARMA_12
9399.pdf. 
3. Disclosure UK, ABPI WEBSITE, (Fr.), https://www.abpi.org.uk/ 
ethics/ethical-responsibility/disclosure-uk/. 
4. Member Company Reports, WEBSITE OF MED’S AUSTRL, https://medic 
inesaustralia.com.au/code-of-conduct/transparency-reporting/health-
consumer-organisation-support-reports/member-company-reports/. 
5. Transparency List, WEBSITE OF FSA (Ger.) https://www.fsa-phar 
ma.de/bezugsgruppen/patientenorganisation/transparenzliste-2017/.  
6. Benefits of Member Companies to Patient Organizations for the Year 
2017, WEBSITE OF FSA WEBSITE (Ger.), https://www.fsa-
pharma.de/bezugsgruppen/patientenorganisation/zuwendungen-intern/.  
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7. La base de données publique Transparence – Santé, Ministère des 
Solidarités et de la Santé (Fr.), 
https://www.transparence.sante.gouv.fr/. 
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